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ABSTRACT 
In this article we are aiming to build cognitive semantics over a first person perspective. Our goal is to 
specify meanings connected to cognitive agents, rooted in their experience and separable from 
language, covering a wide spectrum of cognitions ranging from living organisms (animals, pre-verbal 
children and adult humans) to artificial agents and that the cognitive semantics covers  a broad, 
continuous, spectrum of meanings. 
As regards the used method, the first person perspective enables a kind of grounding of meanings in 
cognitions. An ability of cognitive agents to distinguish is a starting point of our approach, 
distinguishing criteria and schemata are the basic semantic constructs. 
The resulting construction is based on a projection of the environment into a cluster of current 
percepts and a similarity function on percepts. Situation schemata, more sophisticated similarity 
functions, event schemata and distinguishing criteria are built over that basis. Inference rules and 
action rules are components of our semantics. 
An interesting property of the proposed semantics is that it makes possible coexistence of subjective 
and intersubjective meanings. Subjective (first person perspective) meanings are primary, and we 
have shown the way from them to collectively accepted (third person perspective) meanings via 
observable behaviour and feedback about success/failure of actions. An abductive reasoning is an 
important tool on that way. A construct of an instrument, which represents a measure for using 
intersubjective meanings, is introduced. The instrument serves as a tool for an inclusion of 
sophisticated meanings, e.g. of scientific constructs, into our framework. 
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INTRODUCTION 
BACKGROUND 
This article focuses on meanings. Traditional semantic theories almost exclusively dealt with 
meanings of linguistic expressions. Elements of language were either mapped to sets of 
objects and relations in the world (in extensional semantics, e.g. [1]) or to mappings from 
possible worlds to sets of objects and relations (in intensional semantics, e.g. [2, 3]). In any 
case, meanings were seen as something objectively existing regardless of any interpreting 
subjects. This so called objectivist approach has been criticized by Lakoff
 1 [4]
 who proposed 
an alternative called experientialist approach. Within this approach, meanings are rooted in 
experience of physically embodied
2  beings, and this experience is richly structured even 
before language and independently of it. Lakoff’s book has started an entirely new research 
program called cognitive semantics that no longer places meanings in the outside world. 
Meanings are mental entities and are conceptualized by  image schemas  and  idealized 
cognitive models [4], geometrical or topological structures in so called conceptual space [5], 
or force dynamics patterns [6]. Relation of meanings to language, especially grammar, has 
been further elaborated e.g. in [7-10]. 
Cognitive semantics in its various forms has been around for about 25 years; still it has not 
given a satisfactory account of many issues. It has been criticized for absence of a satisfactory 
account of semantics of verbs and sentences/propositions and no theoretical account of how 
the proposed conceptual structures can be constructed; the proposed structures were 
intuitively plausible only for a small subset of basic cases and solutions for more complex 
cases were often described vaguely and in an ad-hoc manner [11, Ch.2]. In the next two 
sections we will specify problems that we try to address in this article and a quick view on 
their proposed solution. After that, more thorough motivation is given. 
PROBLEM 
Although cognitive semantics theoretically claims that meanings are “in the heads” of cognitive 
agents, they are almost exclusively studied and defined as if viewed from outside by an 
independent observer (from the third  person perspective). Definitions used presuppose a 
common understanding of terms, which is often taken for granted. Also, it is quite modern to 
literally “look into the head” and search for neural correlates of meanings, e.g. [12, 13]. While 
we believe that such approach is certainly useful, in this article we want to forget about the brain 
and take more phenomenological stance. An open problem is to ground meanings by the first 
person perspective and subsequently to build an integrated theory of meaning over that basis. 
This basic problem generates a series of other problems. We find as interesting to describe how 
it is possible to integrate purely subjective meanings with intersubjective meanings, meanings 
accepted by a society, meanings assigned to abstractions created in terms of a language and/or 
corresponding in a way to an external environment (and how those meanings may coexist). 
PROPOSED SOLUTION 
We propose a solution based on an ability of cognitive agents (and more generally, an ability 
of living organisms and their parts) to distinguish. This ability is demonstrated also as a 
selection/construction of a schematic view on a complex chunk of percepts (or more abstract 
entities). Our basic semantic constructs are schemata and distinguishing criteria, abstractions 
of the ability to distinguish. A background idea behind is an assumption that some meanings 
may be independent of (or even prior to) a language. M. Takáč and J. Šefránek 
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Similarly, we view and construct the world of meanings as a continuous one, containing a broad 
spectrum of meanings, from those which can be ascribed to animals or preverbal infants on 
one side to meanings, assigned to a language with a rich syntactic structure on the other hand. 
This approach to cognitive semantics was first proposed in [14]. Distinguishing criteria 
conceived as functions were defined as abstraction of the ability to distinguish. Basic types of 
criteria of objects, classes, properties, relations, situations, changes, and plans were proposed, 
together with the way from pre-verbal biological roots through semantics of two-word language 
to language with full syntax and reasoning. The theory was further enhanced with more elaborated 
situation criteria [15] and short term (focus, situation, problem, event) and long-term 
(situation/event types, situation/action rules) distinguishing criteria [16]. The article [16] also 
analysed a case study of animal behaviour [17] in terms of the semantics of distinguishing 
criteria. In [18] we described a computational implementation of the framework focusing on 
autonomous construction of distinguishing criteria in interactions with the environment. In [19] 
we further elaborated the semantics of events and implemented it in a computational model. 
The semantic framework of distinguishing criteria has been developing for ten years. So far 
we and our students have produced 28 articles, eight master theses and one dissertation thesis 
elaborating various aspects of the theory and simulating its partial computational models. 
However, much of our work was only published in Slovak, hence inaccessible to the wider 
audience. This article intends to be comprehensive, but the theory presented here is 
substantially refined and different from our previous work. We will return to their 
comparison in Conclusions. 
MOTIVATION 
Let us motivate the first person perspective on meanings in more detail. A paradigmatic 
stance of science towards objects of research is to remove all marks of subjective points of 
view, to be looking on those objects as independent of the opinion of a researcher. Objects of 
a scientific research can be viewed metaphorically as the third  persons. Also meanings, 
according to that attitude, are usually objects of research, independent of a researcher – they 
should be viewed as “It”. 
Our approach to cognitive semantics is based on another stance: we start from subjective 
meanings (meanings adopted by an animal, by a preverbal infant, by me etc.). Hence, we start 
from  the first  person perspective and on that basis we try to reconstruct intersubjective 
meanings – meanings common to more agents and also meanings which may be understood 
as objective entities, metaphorically located in the realm of ideas. 
We believe that such construction could be fruitful for cognitive semantics: the first person 
perspective enables a kind of grounding (embodiment) of meanings in cognitions of agents 
and the reconstruction of intersubjective meanings on the basis of subjective meanings 
completes the picture. Actually, there are many roles of meanings, from understanding of a 
local environment of an agent to mutual communication of ideas in a society or to an exactly 
verified view on the world. 
Now a more detailed motivation for our basic semantic constructs follows. Our goal is to 
propose a semantic framework joining (integrating) all meanings, from purely subjective ones 
to intersubjective meanings, supported by a somehow codified status. 
The central building blocks of the framework – semantic constructs called distinguishing 
criteria and schemata, cover a broad spectrum of meanings – from meanings which can help 
us to explain behaviour of animals to semantics of languages with rich syntactic structure. 
The framework enables coexistence of subjective and intersubjective meanings, Semantics of distinguishing criteria: from subjective to intersubjective 
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understanding of different, but mutually close, subjective meanings and a characterization of 
a development of intersubjective meanings on the basis of subjective meanings. 
This ambition is based on a belief that there are no strict boundaries between living 
organisms and capabilities of living organisms evolved continuously in the nature. There is 
also a continuum of cognitive capabilities in the nature; those capabilities are implemented 
through cognitive processes, their results can be considered as meanings and, finally and 
consequently, the world of meanings is continuous, without strict boundaries. This world is 
inhabited by subjective meanings of cognitive agents on initial stages of their  mental 
development (imagine a little child which denotes also pigeons by the word “dog”), by 
meanings evolved from those initial ones, by meanings of expressions of languages with 
different levels of complexity, by meanings acquired in times of the elementary school etc. 
New strata of meanings are placed permanently over the previous ones. This continuous 
world of meanings reaches up to meanings of scientific theories. 
Meanings assigned to animal cognition deserve an additional explanation. The analysis of 
animal behaviour leads to conclusions that animals are able to reason and that they have 
knowledge about the external world [16]. They observe results of their own actions or of 
actions of other agents. They distinguish success or failure of actions and learn on the basis of 
such observations. It can be said that they understand relevant features of the environment. 
This understanding can be described in terms of meanings. 
Even a stronger and more general claim is justifiable. We do not assume that meanings are 
assigned only to language expressions. To the contrary, meanings are prior, in a sense, to 
language expressions. An acquisition (and also a development) of a language is possible only 
if some meanings are sooner acquired by the future users of the language. A little child is able 
to use a word correctly, to acquire a meaning of a word only after it is able to recognize, to 
distinguish the corresponding referent or situation in the environment
3. Similarly, animals are 
able to recognize, to distinguish some important objects, their properties, situations in the 
environment without a use of a (human-like natural) language [17]. As a consequence, we 
believe that an understanding of a stratum of some language expressions is possible only on 
the basis of some experience with meanings of some more elementary strata of the language. 
This also holds for understanding of abstract expressions. In that case an experience with abstract 
objects is required, e.g. we can understand the notion of the (mathematical) derivative only 
after some (computational and conceptual) experience with the notion of the limit of a function. 
BASIC FEATURES OF OUR SEMANTICS 
We emphasize cognitive nature of meanings. Objects of the real world, their properties, 
classes of objects etc. are traditionally considered as meanings. Meanings in our semantics 
are embodied in a sense – they are connected to cognitions (cognitive agents
4), and they are 
our abstractions of capabilities of cognitive agents. Two important points should be explained 
in the context of the previous sentence. Meanings are constructed by cognitive agents (i.e., 
our position is constructivist [20]): if an agent distinguishes something and a meaning is 
identified with the ability to distinguish, then the meaning is a product of the agent. On the 
other hand –  meanings are not reducible to mental or neural processes. Cognitions are 
connected to the external environment. Contents of cognitions are dependent on the state of 
the external world (this can be denoted as an externalist position). However, when we speak 
about this relation between cognitive agents and the external world, we locate meanings on 
the side of the agents. We are not interested in meanings which could exist without agents. 
This is the reason why our semantics could be considered as cognitive semantics. 
In this article, we are not going to enter debates about true ontological status of meanings; M. Takáč and J. Šefránek 
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rather we conceptualize them by constructs which enable to explain some observable features 
of the behaviour of cognitive agents. 
We sum up and motivate some important properties of our semantics. A satisfaction of those 
properties is important, if we want to build a realistic account of meanings used by cognitive 
agents. 
1) First, we emphasize an evolutive nature of meanings. The experience of cognitive agents 
leads to some updates or revisions of their beliefs and notions. Notice that beliefs are in 
our approach meanings - we do not identify beliefs of agents with a knowledge base in a 
form of sentences of a language, but we view them as a cluster of meanings. Also 
extensions of knowledge bases and of the conceptual apparatus of an agent should be 
considered as an evolution of meanings because of mutual dependencies of pieces of 
beliefs and of concepts. 
2) Further, an approximate nature of meanings should be taken into account. Meanings (most 
importantly, beliefs and also meanings of sentences) are constructions of the agents. Our 
opinion is that those constructions could be,  and often are,  improved, précised. The 
evolutive and approximate natures of meanings are two sides of the same coin. The second 
one stresses impreciseness of meanings, the first one their development in time, which 
may sometimes lead to more precise meanings. 
3) Fluent nature of meanings is something different from both features mentioned above. The 
world of meanings contains many examples of similar meanings with small continuous 
differences. 
4) Usually, meanings are treated as independent of knowledge. It is argued that knowledge is 
composed of words and their meaning is given. We believe that meanings are tightly 
connected to knowledge. Recall our opinion that knowledge bases of cognitive agents are 
constructed of meanings, not of words. When a knowledge base is built, a set of meanings 
is built. What is important, meanings of words are acquired, modified, made more precise 
in the context of the knowledge base. If we want to express something more subtle, words 
are selected in a stepwise way, their meaning is fluently changed and accommodated in 
order to reach a satisfiable final or preliminary expression of our evolving idea. 
5) Similarly, meanings are tightly connected to reasoning. Cognitive agents need to reason, in 
order to understand and create meanings. 
6) Some meanings are dependent on context, viewpoint and temporary focus of a cognitive agent. 
To sum up, we are aiming to build the semantics with evolving, approximate and fluent 
meanings, which are connected to knowledge and reasoning and dependent on a context. 
OVERVIEW 
The rest of our paper is structured as follows. First, an analysis of intuitions and different 
connotations of the word distinguish  and its semantic relatives discriminate, identify, 
recognize is presented. After that, basic ideas and constructs of our semantics are described, 
explained and defined. We start with a conception of a situated agent (“Me”) in an 
environment. A projection of the environment into a cluster of current percepts and a 
similarity function on percepts are introduced. Subsequently, situation schemata, 
representations of percepts, are described together with further important notions – more 
sophisticated similarity functions,  knowledge base, event schemata and distinguishing 
criterion of change. A  current  state of “Me” is defined as a six-tuple comprising of its 
knowledge base, percepts, beliefs, desires, intentions and behaviour in a given time point. 
The last one is observable from outside; the others can be seen from the first person 
perspective only. After that, we introduce transformers – distinguishing criteria that express 
transformations of schemata. Special types of transformers, called constructors, construct Semantics of distinguishing criteria: from subjective to intersubjective 
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detectors – a type of distinguishing criteria which represent common characteristics of categories 
recognized on schemata by “Me”. Another type of transformers – updaters keep track of 
evolving schemas and distinguishing criteria. Note that with the developing semantic apparatus, 
further kinds of similarity functions are introduced. We introduce several types of detectors 
(of individuals, properties etc.). Inference rules and action rules are built over this equipment. 
The subsequent part of the paper describes a way from subjective meanings (of “Me”) to 
intersubjective meanings. That part starts with a look on an evaluation of subjective meanings 
with respect to observations of success or failure of actions. After that, the third person 
perspective (of an agent “It”) is described. Only actions – the behaviour of “It”, are observable. 
Meanings accepted and used by “It”, its knowledge base with beliefs, desires and intentions 
can be hypothetically derived by abduction. A construct of an instrument, which represents a 
measure for using intersubjective meanings, is introduced. The measure is accepted by a 
group of agents, it is generally accessible and interpreted in a unique way. A summary of 
semantic constructs is presented in the Appendix. Conclusions contain a description of main 
contributions of this paper and a list of open problems and topics for the future research. 
DISTINGUISHING 
We consider distinguishing a basic cognitive ability of living systems, ranging from primitive 
forms such as moving toward/from light or following a gradient of concentration of particular 
chemicals, to distinguishing members of a category from non-members or judging 
appropriateness of certain behaviour or a linguistic expression in particular social context. 
Because of this basic ability, some authors postulate elementary cognition on very low 
evolutionary levels, such as molecules or simple bacteria [21, 22]. Before making 
distinguishing a core element of our cognitive semantics, we would like to analyse different 
connotations of the word distinguish and its semantic relatives discriminate, identify, recognize. 
According to the Oxford Dictionaries
5, distinguish is a verb meaning to: 
1) recognize or treat (someone or something) as different (distinguishing  reality  from 
fantasy); recognize or point out a difference (distinguish between two kinds of holiday); 
be an identifying characteristic or mark of (what distinguishes sport from games?), 
2) manage to discern something barely perceptible (it was too dark to distinguish anything 
more than their vague shapes), 
3) (distinguish oneself) make oneself worthy of respect by one’s behaviour or achievements 
(many distinguished themselves in the fight against Hitler). 
While the third sense is unrelated to our analysis, the first two senses refer to recognizing/discerning 
differences, as well as identifying common characteristics. In the same Oxford Dictionaries, 
the relevant sense of the word discriminate  is to “recognize a distinction, differentiate 
(discriminate between different facial expressions); perceive or constitute the difference in 
or between (features that discriminate this species from other gastropods)”. 
Definition of relevant senses of recognize includes “identify (someone or something) from 
having encountered them before; know again (I recognized  her when her wig fell off); 
identify from knowledge of appearance or character (Pat is very good at recognizing wild 
flowers); (of a computer or other machine) automatically identify and respond correctly to (a 
sound, printed character, etc.)”. 
Definition of identify  includes the sense “establish or indicate who or what (someone or 
something) is (the men identified themselves as federal police); recognize or distinguish, 
especially something considered worthy of attention (a system that ensures that the pupil’s 
real needs are identified). M. Takáč and J. Šefránek 
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The dictionary definitions are somewhat circular, as the meanings of the words identify, 
discriminate, distinguish and recognize are intertwined; however in the following text we will 
use the word recognize  when emphasizing knowing again, the word discriminate  when 
emphasizing telling a difference, the word identify  to establish an identity or a category 
membership or a state of affairs, a fact, a rule, and the word distinguish in a more general 
sense encompassing all the previous ones. A similar distinction is made in Harnad’s seminal 
paper [23] in a more technical description of processes in a cognitive system: “To be able to 
discriminate is to be able to judge whether two inputs are the same or different,  and, if 
different, how different they are. Discrimination is a relative judgment, based on our capacity 
to tell things apart and discern their degree of similarity. To be able to identify is to be able to 
assign a unique (usually arbitrary) response – a "name" – to a class of inputs, treating them all 
as equivalent or invariant in some respect. Identification is an absolute judgment, based on 
our capacity to tell whether or not a given input is a member of a particular category.” 
According to Harnad, discrimination needs so called iconic representations  (internal 
analogue projections on distal objects on our sensory surfaces), while identification needs 
categorical representations (selected invariant features of icons that reliably distinguish a 
member of a category from non-members). One of us analysed the difference between 
discrimination and identification in the context of our semantic theory in [18]. 
In a sense, the ability to identify (e.g. a particular horse as a horse) presupposes the ability to 
discriminate (tell apart (at least some) horses from non-horses) and also includes recognition 
(I could hardly identify a horse if I hadn’t seen any horses before). 
As our ambition is to build a semantic theory, we cannot avoid the term understand too. In 
line with our proclaimed goal, we would be willing to extend its meaning beyond the most 
usual “understand a word or a linguistic expression” toward understanding situations, events, 
and the world around us. Moreover our notion of understanding or meanings should also 
include animals, preverbal infants, and even artificial agents. In a basic sense, understanding 
a situation means reacting to it appropriately with respect to one’s goals [20]. However, this 
somewhat behaviouristic definition does  not include a case when someone understands 
something without displaying any overt behaviour. Our ultimate definition of (high-level) 
understanding is
6  “knowing the truth about something and being able to explain why”. 
Elaborating the concept of truth and intersubjective instruments of knowing within the 
framework of the proposed semantic theory is one of the novel contributions of this paper. 
THE FIRST-PERSON SEMANTICS OF “ME” 
The goal of this section is to gradually build semantic constructs as they are seen by the 
cognitive agent itself. However, on the (meta-) level of presentation, we cannot completely 
avoid the third-person-type descriptions, as we are hoping to transfer our ideas to the reader 
in interpersonal communication by words with commonly established meaning. The way 
from subjective to interpersonally accepted meanings is proposed later in the article. 
SITUATED AGENT AND ITS ENVIRONMENT 
We already mentioned that our semantic framework is cognitive, i.e. we place the meanings 
inside the cognitive agents. It also significantly overlaps with pragmatics, in the sense that 
meanings are related to knowledge, understanding and reasoning of a particular agent. 
Usefulness/correctness of meanings can be tested by pragmatic criteria in the real 
world/environment (external to the agent). 
Imagine a cognitive agent situated in an environment Env. The agent is coupled with its 
environment via sensing and acting. The environment is dynamic in the sense it can change Semantics of distinguishing criteria: from subjective to intersubjective 
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from moment to moment based on the agent’s actions and other factors (external to the agent) 
including actions of other agents. We will denote a current state of the environment Envt 
(where t stands for a time point). 
Currently being performed actions of the agent constitute
7 its observable behaviour Beht. We 
assume that the agent has an internal view on itself – its internal state, memories, knowledge, 
which are not directly observable from outside
8. This view (called “Me”) is described in more 
detail in the following section. The agent is dynamic too, as its internal state and knowledge 
are changing in time (shaped by its experience). 
PERCEPTS 
In any moment, the agent’s perception of the environment is mediated via its senses. So, the 
agent views the environmental state as a collection/cluster of current percepts P(Envt). In this 
sense,  P  is a projection function (projecting the environment into the agent’s internal 
perspective) but also a selection function: what exactly is projected is determined by the 
agent’s embodiment and physical limits
9, its past experiences, its current mental state and 
focus of attention, etc. 
However, we do not ascribe to P  much of a sense-making; this is applied to P(Envt) 
afterwards. P(Envt) contains rather crude (low-level) percepts forming iconic representations 
in Harnad’s sense [23] (see section Distinguishing). Iconic representations allow for 
discrimination, i.e. being able to tell if the things are different/similar, and possibly how 
different/similar they are. We formalize this subjective discrimination ability by a similarity 
function simd. In the first approximation, simd operates on percepts and is able to detect 
perceptual similarities/differences; later we extend the agent with more sophisticated 
similarity functions. 
SITUATION SCHEMATA 
The similarity function enables the agent to recognize common patterns among recurring 
percepts and gradually extract schematic views of their relations. In people (and probably 
other embodied agents too), basic schemata
10  arise directly from recurring sensorimotor 
experience early in development
11 [24] and more complex ones are gradually built on top of 
these. Cohen et al. [25] describe how different levels of schemata (perceptual redescriptions) 
can be learned based on detecting statistical contingences among perceptual streams 
(e.g. inferring a concept of an object as time-locked correlations of percepts in different 
sensory streams – a sort of a multimodal integration; see also [26]). Schemata allow the agent 
to make sense of its current perceptions by establishing their relation to previous experiences 
(by recognizing similarity and evoking memories) and, more generally, integrate the new 
experience within the web of existing knowledge (expressed by schemata). This corresponds 
to Piagetian process of assimilation [24]. 
In this sense, a sense making act σ  (signification  in  [27]) of the agent is a process of 
constructing or evoking appropriate schemata, given the current percepts P(Envt). We will 
denote the result of signification σ(P(Envt)) and call it situation schema. Unlike percepts that 
are pure transductions of the external environment, a situation schema is a representation 
with the added value of interpretation of percepts [28]. A situation schema can be formally 
represented  by a labelled graph with percepts in vertices linked by edges expressing their 
mutual relations. More precisely, only some vertices correspond to percepts; other express 
inferred constructs. For example, if the agent recognizes percepts in multiple modalities as 
constituting a single object, the graph will contain a separate vertex for this object, with all its 
percepts linked to it by edges of an appropriate type. The type/semantics of an edge is M. Takáč and J. Šefránek 
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represented by its label. The object vertex can further be linked to other schemata in memory, 
recognized/evoked as similar or related in some aspect to this object (e.g. recognizing this object 
as my dog). Sometimes a relation is so complex it is best expressed by a schema of its own; in 
that case, an n-ary relation is represented by an (n + 1)-ary hyperedge
12 with one vertex serving 
as  a handle/access  point to another schema.  So we can see that the schema can contain 
vertices of various types. The type of a vertex is expressed by its label. We allow multiple 
labels for vertices and edges; these can be interpreted as different views on the same 
situation. Formally we can organize labels in layers (thus creating a layered graph) or we can 
see the layers as separate schemata linked together (by establishing similarity/identity relations 
among the corresponding vertices and edges). Later we will define means for transformations 
among schemata. 
In order to establish a relation to previous experiences, the agent needs to maintain some sort 
of memory. We will call the agent’s long term memory its knowledge base  KBt. The 
knowledge base is a set that includes the agent’s remembered situation schemata – a subset
13 
of {σ(P(Envi)) | i < t} (we will gradually extend the definition of KBt with other constructs). 
The knowledge base also contains a set of similarity functions (without going to details, we 
assume that the agent gradually learns to use functions for detecting similarities/differences 
among schemata, derived from the most elementary simd that operates on percepts). 
EVENT SCHEMATA 
The world around the agent is dynamic; situations change to other situations. A change of one 
situation to another constitutes an event. Being endowed with similarity functions, the agent 
is able to perceive temporal changes in situations. We describe this ability by a construct of a 
distinguishing criterion of change. We formalize a distinguishing criterion of change as a 
function defined on pairs of the form (σ(P(Envt-1)), σ(P(Envt))); if the second one is a result of 
a change of the first, the assigned value is 1. 
The agent represents distinguished events by event schemata. An event schema consist of two 
or more situation schemata linked by (hyper)edges labelled by distinguishing criteria of 
change. Event schemata can be constructed or evoked from memory (in case of recognition 
of a similarity to a past event). We will denote the act of event selection ε and its resulting 
event schema ε(σ(P(Envt)), KBt). We will also extend the definition of the knowledge base to 
include event schemata 
  KBt := KBt ∪{ε(σ(P(Envi)), KBi) | i < t}.  (1) 
CURRENT STATE OF “ME” 
So far, the agent’s current knowledge base is described as a bag of interlinked schemata of 
situations and events. However, schemata do not have a uniform status at each moment: some 
of them describe the interpretation of the current/recent situation/event; others are related or 
associated to it, yet others are “inactive” at the moment. Some are attended to or focused on, 
others are not. Moreover, the agent can be in the middle of executing a plan or pursuing a 
goal. A goal of an agent can be expressed as a situation schema of a desired situation. A 
problem  or a question can be expressed as a situation schema (perhaps with special 
vertex/edge labels) too. The agent needs to distinguish what a particular schema represents in 
a moment – its particular autoreflexive attitude toward the schema. In the first approximation, 
we imagine the autoreflexive attitudes are represented by special labels on (elements of) 
schemata.  Current  autoreflexive attitudes temporarily give some of the schemata in the 
knowledge base a special status. These schemata can be further factorized to a current set of 
the agent’s beliefs Bt (schemata of currently perceived situation/event), a set of desires Dt 
(schemata of the agent’s needs and long-term goals), a set of intentions It (schemata of the Semantics of distinguishing criteria: from subjective to intersubjective 
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agent’s current goal, a plan to achieve this goal together with a state of its execution, and 
other agenda-related structures)
 14. A current state of “Me” can be defined as 
  Met = (KBt, P(Envt), Bt, Dt, It, Beht),  (2) 
where only the agent’s overt behaviour Beht is observable from outside; all other structures 
can only be seen from the first person perspective. 
TRANSFORMERS 
We  have  said that situations and events are related in various ways. Initially (while the 
agent’s similarity function does not go much beyond crude holistic “same/different” 
perceptual similarity judgements), the agent’s knowledge base will mostly contain holistic 
“snapshots” of its experiences (schemata with a few basic labels). Later, when the agent has 
accumulated sufficient number of exemplars, it can extract their common/invariant features, 
etc.
15, which results in more complex similarity functions and a richer repertoire of labels. 
Simpler schemata can be refined – transformed to more informed ones by adding new layers 
of labels, simplified (zoomed out) by removing labels, linked to other schemata by 
associations, pruned by attention shift or focusing on a particular detail (zoomed in), merged 
(abstraction), etc. [16]. 
We will formally describe the agent’s ability to distinguish (and perform) these (and other) 
transformations on schemata with a construct of transformer. A transformer is a type of 
distinguishing criterion that expresses transformations of schemata: it has both a declarative 
aspect (as a description of relations among schemata) and a procedural aspect (as a device 
that transforms a schema into another schema). 
A special type of transformer is called updater. The concept of updater expresses the idea of 
evolutive nature of meanings: If some of the agent’s meanings change in time, the agent can 
keep track of this change by using an updater that will take the schema of the old (original) 
meaning and connect it to the schema of the new (updated) meaning by a specially labelled 
edge. The same holds for updates of distinguishing criteria. A schema with a single node 
labelled by an original distinguishing criterion is linked by a specially labelled edge to 
another schema with a single node labelled by the new (updated) distinguishing criterion. 
This mechanism helps to preserve the identity of (evolving) meanings. 
DETECTORS 
By noticing recurring patterns and similarities, the agent can start grouping together situation 
and event schemata recognized as similar in some respect (i.e. by some similarity function). 
These groups of similar exemplars constitute elementary types of situations/events. Extracting 
common features of the exemplars can in turn lead to construction of more sophisticated 
similarity functions which can be used to factor schemata into categories
16.  Special 
transformers called constructors operate on sets of schemata (exemplars) and construct a new 
distinguishing criterion representing their common characteristics, called detector
17. 
Internally, a detector consists of a schema specifying a template with features important for 
category membership (in some cases more or less abstract representation of a prototypical, 
salient or most frequent category member) and a similarity function specifying how important 
the particular features are and how they contribute to the overall similarity. Functionally, a 
detector can be formalized as a partial
18 function that operates on (fragments of) schemata 
and returns their degree of membership in the implicitly represented category (either as 0 
equals to “no”, 1 equals to “yes”, or by a fuzzy value from the closed interval [0, 1]). 
A detector operates on schemata (or their elements –  vertices and edges) and is able to 
distinguish not only its constituting exemplars, but also generalize to other similar schemata. M. Takáč and J. Šefránek 
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Some detectors distinguish situation types (e.g. a traffic jam) and event types (e.g. a car 
crash), others distinguish their elements –  objects/individuals  (such as Barack Obama), 
classes  of objects (dog, stone, food), properties  of objects (red, big, hairy), relations 
between/among objects (bigger than, ancestor), changes (grow, faint). 
INFERENCE AND ACTION RULES 
Having defined schemata, transformers and detectors, we can revisit the signification and 
view it as an iterative process; for example the situation schema of a woman with a dog can 
initially consist of two unidentified objects (linked with their percepts), perhaps linked 
together by an unlabelled edge. Fragments of this situation schema will then be recognized by 
detectors vaguely distinguishing dogs and women. Hence, the object vertices will be 
appropriately labelled by or linked to the detectors. Another detector can recognize their 
spatial configuration, so the edge connecting the objects will be given a new label, too. 
This can in turn trigger further transformations on the situation schema, depending on the 
current context (the current  state of “me”). The agent can keep track of sequences of 
transformations typically occurring in certain situations and extract this knowledge in the 
form of rules  –  schemata connecting premises  (prerequisites  –  the rule’s applicability 
conditions represented by distinguishing criteria of situation and event types) to 
consequences (represented either directly by situation and event schemata or indirectly by 
transformers that can be applied to the current situation/event and construct the resulting 
one), optionally with  justifications  (situation and event types guarding the evidence that 
would prevent the application of the rule in case of default rules; see [16] for more details). 
Some rules specify dynamics of internal transformations (so called inference rules), others 
specify the effects of overt actions on the environment (so called action rules, see the next 
section). Rules can be chained together in the form of plans, presumably leading to 
satisfaction of a goal. The agent can keep track of success/failure of a plan in the past. 
Remembered successful plans are called routines. 
TOWARDS INTERSUBJECTIVE MEANINGS 
MEANING AND BEHAVIOUR 
A first important step on the way from purely subjective meanings to intersubjective 
meanings is described in the following paragraphs. 
Assume that a cognitive agent (“Me”) equipped with subjective meanings only observes 
results of its own actions or of actions of other agents. “Me” distinguishes success or failure 
of actions and learns on the basis of such observations. “Me” evaluates its own behaviour and 
gets a kind of distinguishing of something what can be regarded as truth. 
We will describe how such observations lead to objective meanings, more precisely, how 
some subjective meanings induce behaviour and how “Me” can assign truth to some schemata. 
It was stated in the previous section that some transformers trigger overt behaviour. Actions 
are represented by complex schemata – action rules. Their consequences are transformers 
which assign a schema representing a resulting situation to the current situation schema. 
Those transformers may have for some agents a rather complex structure. They may realize a 
short-term mental operation – an imagination of the action, a specification or a recall of the 
required effects of the action and, finally, firing the action. The change specified by the 
transformer is an expected result of the action and it is expected that the result complies with 
the specified effects of the action. Semantics of distinguishing criteria: from subjective to intersubjective 
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Let us describe in more detail how an action rule is selected, fired and how its result is 
evaluated. “Me” non-deterministically selects some desires (represented in its knowledge 
base by a distinguishing criterion or a schema), transforms them using some transformers 
onto intentions and subsequently other transformers are used in order to map intentions onto 
actions (members of Beh). 
However, triggering (an attempt to do) an action is essentially a complex trial and error 
procedure, which comprises learning of prerequisites and effects of the action (operations on 
situation schemata) and evaluating success/failure of the action. We will describe it in terms 
of our semantics. 
Assume an agent that connects an action rule with a distinguishing criterion of a required 
change (a goal, a required effect of the action). If the corresponding action was executed, then 
the premise and consequence of the corresponding action rule may be modified according to 
the current situation schema and the current change of the situation schema by the action. 
If an action should have been executable in a situation (according to the premise of the 
corresponding action rule), but the attempt to execute it failed, then the agent modifies the 
premise of the corresponding action rule. There is a variety of possibilities how to modify it [29], 
but we will not discuss them here. 
What is important here, an evaluation of an action rule is based on a comparison of situations 
(the premise of the rule vs. the situation in which the action was executed; the consequence of 
the rule and the required effect vs. the real effect of the executed action). 
The comparison is described in our semantics in terms of a similarity function. An application 
of this function, even if it is a subjective distinguishing criterion, enables to evaluate 
(subjective) meanings with respect to the results of a behaviour in the external environment 
and to reach a kind of understanding and of an (approximate) truth (or falsity) of 
prerequisites, effects and action rules, which is dependent on the external environment via the 
success or failure of observations. 
Reasoning capabilities (some transformers, some rules) can be tuned in a similar manner. 
A final remark – besides rules of the structure described above, other complex schemata, such 
as modalities, deontic constructions, more complex generalizations, etc., are also construable 
on the basis of situation or event schemata. However, we will not discuss them. As regards 
the truth or falsity point of view, some actions can serve as tests of their (approximate) truth. 
We believe that an evaluation of a success or a failure of actions in an environment makes 
possible a stepwise more precise comparison of subjective meanings and a more precise 
approximation of truth. 
Now, when we are equipped with a notion of an approximate truth, we can proceed to a kind 
of the third person perspective. 
THE THIRD-PERSON PERSPECTIVE 
The third-person agent, observable from the viewpoint of “Me” may be represented on the 
basis of pure observations as Agt = (Beht). We can – and will – use “It” instead of “Ag”. 
“Me” considers actions of other agents as events. Suppose that “Me” observes an action of an 
“It”. The current situation and the effect of the action are observable by “Me”. On that basis 
an abduction of action rules of “It” is possible. Similarly for an inference of its P(Env), B, D, 
I, i.e., KB, by “Me”. Notice that the results of this inference are not in general identical to 
subjective meanings of the agent “It” (to emphasize this difference, we mark the inferred M. Takáč and J. Šefránek 
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structures with the apostrophe (’). We will call them an external view on subjective meanings. 
Thus, we can specify a derivable third-person agent: 
  It’t = (KB’t, P’(Env t), B’ t, D’ t, I’ t, Beh t),  (3) 
also indexed by the agent if needed. 
In general, an external view on distinguishing criteria and schemata of other agents may be 
specified in terms of distinguishing criteria and schemata of “Me”. We can say that “Me” 
creates a “theory of mind” of other agents. 
Some similarity functions enable to identify similarity of subjective meanings of one agent in 
two different time-points, of distinguishing criteria corresponding to different sensual inputs 
etc. Most importantly, they enable to compare Me’s external views on subjective meanings of 
two different (third-person) agents. “Me” can also compare its own subjective meanings and 
its external view on subjective meanings of other agents. 
Thus,  a relation  of a close neighbourhood (or of an approximate identity) of two 
distinguishing criteria or schemata is created for high values of a similarity function. The 
approximate identity specifies a chunk of distinguishing criteria or schemata and enables a 
step from subjective to intersubjective meanings. 
OTHER STEPS TOWARDS INTERSUBJECTIVE MEANINGS 
In this section a brief survey of some possible conditions leading to intersubjective meanings 
is given. 
Similarity functions and their impact on creating close neighbourhood relations represent our 
attempt to include autoreflexive reasoning into our semantic constructions. Autoreflexive 
attitudes were discussed in Section Current state of “Me”. It was noticed that the simpler way 
how to specify autoreflexive attitudes were labels. Autoreflexive reasoning implemented in 
terms of similarity functions and close neighbourhood chunks is a more advanced form of 
autoreflexive attitudes. 
In the preceding section we described how this kind of autoreflexive reasoning can enable a 
transfer from subjective to less or more intersubjective meanings. In general, we consider 
autoreflexive reasoning an important step towards intersubjective meanings. It is well known 
that autoreflexive reasoning enables to create hypotheses about the mental states of other 
agents (a theory of mind) [30]. 
Consider communication and cooperation of agents (without a language capability). Again, 
observations of success or failure of some actions fired in a process of 
communication/cooperation lead to mutual tuning of meanings (rules, situation and event 
types, distinguishing criteria) [31]. 
Next, we note that there are physical conditions for acquiring similar meanings, i.e., agents 
with similar “bodies” (similar anatomic, physiologic and genetic dispositions are determined 
to have similar subjective meanings, if they live and act in an environment of a common type. 
Finally, we mention an exceptionally effective role of a language on the way to 
intersubjective meanings. A detailed investigation of this topic is one of our future goals, but 
it should be noted that most of our past works were devoted to the distinguishing criteria 
semantics in a relation to a language in general (to languages with different levels of 
complexity) or to a language acquisition (see e.g. [14, 15, 18, 20]). 
Our attention is focused on a semantic treatment of verbs and sentences in order to overcome 
simplifications of logical or linguistic semantics. A way based on schemata of situations and Semantics of distinguishing criteria: from subjective to intersubjective 
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events is proposed. As a consequence, we can characterize a situation based meanings of 
some sentences without a clear reference to some external objects. 
Finally, it should be noticed that a plenty of meanings (distinguishing criteria and schemata) 
are introduced in terms of a language. We can speak about intersubjectivity modulo 
vagueness of a natural language. 
INSTRUMENTS 
In this section a tool is introduced which models an intersubjectivity of meanings beyond the 
limits of natural language with an inherent vagueness. However, it should be noticed that a 
natural language has a potential of bootstrapping such levels of intersubjectivity which 
overcome a common use of the natural language. 
We model intersubjective meanings (distinguishing criteria and schemata) in terms of a 
measure, which is generally accessible, interpretable in a unique way and accepted by a group 
of agents. We will call it instrument. 
Some comments are needed. First we focus on the acceptance by a group of agents. Dogmata 
recorded in some texts with an officially codified status and interpretation may be accepted 
by a group of agents, but not by another group. This is not only the case of dogmata; 
measurements were instruments verifying  truth of geometrical claims for old Egyptian 
experts in geometry. A proof of geometrical claims was an acceptability instrument for 
ancient Greeks. 
A selection of an instrument may be considered a cognitive paradigm. Let us consider 
Elements by Euclid [32]. We may assume that Euclid believed that his own axiomatization of 
geometry is an embodiment of a pattern of human thinking, and he chose this pattern as a 
paradigm for a presentation of the knowledge of geometry. 
Second, a general accessibility of an instrument is a natural condition – if an instrument 
should play a role of a tool of intersubjectivity for a group of agents, then an access to the 
instrument for each member of the group must be guaranteed. 
Third, an interpretation of an instrument in an unambiguous way is an important condition, 
which requires a deeper analysis. 
At least two levels of this condition may be distinguished. An interpretation of the instrument 
may be based on a mechanical procedure, on an algorithm  as an extreme case, which 
evaluates the value of the instrument for given inputs. A simple example of such instrument is 
a multiplication algorithm or a cooking recipe (we will discuss examples in more detail 
below). However, there is also a less strict possibility. A group of agents is equipped with 
advanced knowledge and (reasoning) methods, which enable answer questions reliably. 
Distinguishing of a malign tumour by a histologist is an example of this. In an ideal case, all 
(good) histologists should diagnose a case of a malign tumour equivocally
19. 
Let us proceed to a more formal account of instruments. A function, which represents a 
distinguishing criterion equipped by an instrument, has an additional argument, which 
denotes the instrument. The value of the function is computed (determined) according to the 
instrument. The weight of an object may serve as an example. An example of a distinguishing 
criterion with a non-algorithmic instrument is an atlas of mushrooms. 
Instead of a subjective similarity function and an induced close neighbourhood relation of 
distinguishing criteria, thanks to instruments we can obtain exact transformations between 
distinguishing criteria, e.g. from kilograms to pounds. M. Takáč and J. Šefránek 
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It is obvious that distinguishing criteria are made more precise by instruments. 
Schemata with instruments require a more elaborated description. We start with an example. 
Imagine a situation type, which represents the multiplication operation on natural numbers. 
The schema may contain a ternary hyperedge assigning a result to two operands. The role of 
vertices (operand or result) is specified by a label
20. In general, labels may specify different 
roles of vertices connected by a hyperedge in an arbitrary schema. A finite set of correct 
(true) instances of this schema may be generated by an instrument – a transformer associated 
with the well-known table. 
The infinite set of all true instances may be generated, e.g. by a recursive definition of the 
multiplication.  The table and the recursive definition play the  role of instruments  in our 
semantics. Both the table and the recursive definition are parts of the knowledge base. The 
first one can be represented as a set of hyperedges connecting three vertices labelled by two 
operands and one result. The second one is discussed as follows. Our goal is to represent the 
following two equations by a transformer and an associated situation schema:  
  x.0 = 0,  (4) 
  x.s(y) = (x.y) + x.  (5) 
The schema may contain two hyperedges: one with two occurrences of vertices labelled by 0 
and one occurrence of an unlabelled vertex. This hyperedge corresponds to expression (4) 
and represents the base case of the recursion. The second hyperedge  corresponds to 
expression  (5) and represents the recursive case. It  connects an unlabelled vertex 
(corresponding to x), then a vertex (corresponding to s(y)) connected by an edge to the access 
point of another schema, which assigns a predecessor to a given number, and, finally, the 
third vertex (result) connected by an edge back to the (access point of the) multiplication 
schema and by another edge to the access point of an addition schema. The transformer 
realizes a recursive algorithm for an arbitrary pair of natural numbers and generates a 
situation schema – a true instance of the schema of the situation type, e.g. an instance that 
contains a hyperedge with vertices labelled by 2, 3 and 6. For example, the transformer first 
performs pattern matching that reduces the problem to series of more elementary problems 
(2.2, 2.1 and 2.0) and finally it halts on the case 2.0 = 0. On the way back, it computes the 
series of additions (0 + 2 + 2 + 2 = 6). 
A decision about a malign tumour by a histologist was mentioned as an example of 
a  non-algorithmic instrument. We can imagine the  instrument used by a histologist as a 
situation schema with a vertex labelled as tumour and a set of edges with target vertices 
labelled by the relevant histological properties of malign tumours. Some other labels may be 
assigned to those vertices – they contain a description of the corresponding property in a 
language. Moreover, some other means of expression may be used: e.g. some properties are 
optional, some obligatory (this corresponds to a possibility to introduce partial properties 
which were discussed before). This expressivity may be added by operators labelling the 
corresponding edges. Sometimes also some (generalized) quantifiers applied to a set of edges 
might be used: for example, at least m  of  n  properties should be present (general and 
existential quantifiers are special cases). 
To sum-up: A distinguishing criterion with an instrument is a function with a parameter that 
specifies how to compute its value for its arguments. The parameter is called instrument and 
it is a transformer. The transformer is either an algorithm or a conventional, more or less 
mechanical, procedure based on an expert knowledge. In the latter case, the expert knowledge 
is expressed by a set of schemata associated with the transformer (as its additional 
arguments). A schema generated by transformer and a set of associated schemata will be Semantics of distinguishing criteria: from subjective to intersubjective 
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called schema with an instrument. 
Some final remarks: A precise notion of an identity of meanings can be based on transformers 
defined on instruments. Sometimes rather subtle tools are needed. 
An optional specification of a group of agents can be added as an argument to a 
distinguishing criterion with an instrument. 
A specification of a group of agents in a schema may serve as an example of meta-level 
features of schemata, e.g. a schema may be connected by an edge labelled e.g. as “owner” to 
a vertex labelled by an identification of a group of agents. 
CONCLUSIONS 
MAIN CONTRIBUTIONS 
Building on our previous works, we have proposed a semantic framework with meanings 
connected to cognitive agents, rooted in their experience and separable from language, 
covering a wide spectrum of cognitions ranging from living organisms (animals, pre-verbal 
children and adult humans) to artificial agents (softbots, robots, multi-agent systems etc.) In 
this article, we substantially revised our previous conception of distinguishing criteria (added 
transformers and constructors), enriched the framework with schemata, knowledge base, 
belief – desire – intention structures and other constructs (for their full list, see the Appendix). 
An interesting property of the proposed semantics is that it enables coexistence of subjective 
and intersubjective meanings. Subjective (the first person perspective) meanings are primary, 
and we have shown the way from them to collectively accepted (the third person perspective) 
meanings via observable behaviour and feedback about success/failure of actions and 
instruments. We have defined the notion of truth in a similar way. This is a novel and 
previously unpublished contribution. 
OPEN PROBLEMS AND FUTURE RESEARCH 
First of all, the proposed semantic framework is in many respects still a blueprint, especially 
in terms of a proper mathematical formalization. A more detailed, deeper and more precise 
analysis of the features of our semantics is needed; together with an argumentation that the 
features are really satisfied and an attempt to argue that those features should be satisfied by 
each cognitive semantics that aspires to be biologically relevant. 
Regarding particulars, construction of more complex schemata as rules, a more detailed re-
construction of reaching an approximate truth with subjective meanings and an elaboration of 
the idea of instrument are necessary. 
It is also needed to elaborate details of the relation of the proposed semantic constructs to 
natural language and particular linguistic constructions, e.g. define semantics of verbs and 
propositions, and analyse the role of natural language on the way to intersubjective meanings. 
We also plan to tell a developmental story in more detail – how can an agent construct/learn 
schemata and distinguishing criteria from experience. The theory calls for empirical 
evaluation in terms of analyses of animal behaviour, child development studies and 
psychological experiments. It should also be supported by computational models and their 
simulations. Regarding instruments, it would be interesting to come up with particular case 
studies of methodologies and paradigm shifts in the history of science. 
Our future plans further include enhancing schemata and distinguishing criteria with affective 
values (possibly based on previous success/failure or reinforcement), elaboration of the M. Takáč and J. Šefránek 
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agent’s motivational system, detailed formalization of (non-monotonic) reasoning within this 
framework, including fast reasoning (jumping to conclusions). 
Despite these open issues, we have identified an important research direction and have taken 
first steps toward more biologically relevant semantic theory. We believe that this theory has 
a potential to address several current issues in linguistics, logic, cognitive science and 
philosophy of science, with possible interesting applications in artificial intelligence, adaptive 
knowledge representation, machine learning and cognitive modeling. 
APPENDIX 
SUMMARY OF SEMANTIC CONSTRUCTS 
Semantic construct  Formalization 
Current percepts  P(Envt) – a function projecting the current state of the 
environment into a cluster of percepts (low-level iconic 
representations such as retina image etc., essentially numerical 
vectors/matrices). 
Perceptual similarity 
function 
simd – a function operating on percepts; returns their degree of 
similarity (0 ⇔ none,1 ⇔ total, or fuzzy values from [0, 1]). 
Schema  A basic meaning-carrying building block of our semantics. A 
layered labelled hypergraph; both vertices and edges can have 
multiple layers of labels. Some vertices are percepts, others are 
inferred constructs; the edges express relations. The labels are 
distinguishing criteria or autoreflexive attitudes (carrying type 
information). 
Distinguishing criterion  DC – another basic meaning-carrying building block of our 
semantics, formalized as a function. Types: DC of change, 
transformers and detectors. 
Signification  Sense-making function σ; it maps current percepts onto a 
situation schema. 
Situation schema  σ(P(Envt)) – result of signification; it represents the current 
situation. 
Distinguishing criterion 
of change 
A function defined on pairs (σ(P(Envt-1)), σ(P(Envt))); it returns 
1, if the latter is the result of a change of the former. 
Event schema  ε(σ(P(Envt)), KBt) – two or more situation schemata linked by 
(hyper)edges labelled by DC of change. 
Similarity functions  More sophisticated functions operating on schemata; they return 
their degree of similarity. We will denote the set of all the 
agent’s current similarity functions as Simt. 
Knowledge base  KBt – a set of the agent’s past and current situation and event 
schemata and similarity functions. 
KBt = { σ(P(Envi)) | i ≤ t } ∪ { ε(σ(P(Envi)), KBi) | i ≤ t } ∪ Simt 
Autoreflexive attitude  A type of vertex/edge label carrying information about their 
semantic type (e.g. object vertex, schema handle, current goal, 
active, inactive, “related to” edge, etc.). 
Beliefs  Bt – a set of schemata of the agent’s currently perceived 
situation and event(s). 
Desires  Dt – a set of schemata of agent’s current needs and long-term goals. 
Intentions  It – a set of schemata of the agent’s current goal, a plan to 
achieve this goal and the state of its execution. Semantics of distinguishing criteria: from subjective to intersubjective 
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Semantic construct  Formalization 
Behaviour  Beht – the set of the agent’s currently performed actions. The 
behaviour is observable by other agents. 
Current state of “Me”  Met – the agent’s current knowledge base, percepts, beliefs, desires, 
intentions and behaviour, Met = (KBt, P(Envt), Bt, Dt, It, Beht) 
Transformer  A type of DC; a function that transforms schemata to other 
schemata, e.g. refine, zoom in/out, abstract, merge, etc. 
Constructor  A type of transformer that creates/modifies detectors (usually by 
inducing common properties of exemplars). 
Updater  A special type of transformer that keeps track of changing 
schemas and DC. 
Detector  A type of DC; a function operating on (fragments of) schemata 
and returning their degree of membership in an implicitly 
represented category. Internally, it consists of a template schema 
and a similarity function. Types: individuals, classes, properties, 
relations, changes, situation types, event types. 
Rule  A schema connecting premises (prerequisites expressed as DC 
of situation/event types) and justifications (situation/event types 
preventing the rule application) to consequences (transformers 
of situation/event schemata). 
Inference rule  A rule with transformers realizing internal/mental operations 
such as change of the focus of attention, zooming in/out, etc. 
Action rule  A type of a rule associated with an action (overt behaviour); the rule 
specifies the prerequisites and consequences of the action execution. 
Goal  A desired situation - a situation schema labelled with the 
autoreflexive attitude “goal”.  
Plan  A chain of rules supposedly leading to the fulfilment of a goal. 
Routine  A plan successful in the past. 
The other agent – 
observable “It” in a 
time point t 
Itt = (Beh t) – observed behaviour in a time point t. 
Abducible agent “It” 
(possibly in a time 
point t) 
(KB’t, P’(Env t), B’ t, D’ t, I’ t) – all components marked with ‘ 
are constructed by abduction based on the Me’s own knowledge 
(theory of mind). 
Complete view of 
another agent  
It’t = (KB’t, P’(Env t), B’ t, D’ t, I’ t, Beh t). 
Close neighbourhood 
relation 
A relation between distinguishing criteria or schemata determined 
by high values of a corresponding similarity function. 
Distinguishing criterion 
with an instrument 
A function with an instrument parameter; the parameter specifies 
a transformer able to compute the value of the function. 
Schema with an 
instrument 
A schema generated by a transformer (an algorithm or a 
conventional, rather mechanical procedure, based on an expert 
knowledge) and a set of associated schemata. 
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REMARKS 
1See also [5] for an analysis of shortcomings of traditional semantic theories. 
2Meanwhile, so called embodied approach (see e.g. [33-36]) is becoming a dominant 
paradigm in modern cognitive science. 
3However, we do not deny the influence of language on further shaping of concepts. 
4By agent we mean any autonomous entity that achieves some goals in its environment by 
sensing and acting [37]; this includes virtual/simulated actions in virtual environments, too. 
5http://oxforddictionaries.com, accessed 8
th Aug 2012. 
6The insight or ability to explain/justify is a measure indicating different levels of 
understanding on a continuum. If two people come to the same conclusion about something, 
but only one of them is able to explain why, it is this one whose understanding is 
better/deeper. 
7Actions usually do not last an instant but a time interval. In this article we abstract away 
from temporal issues and simply assume that the same action will (re)appear in the Beht set 
for all t in its time span. 
8For the moment we put aside the question whether the agent can consciously access all its 
knowledge, memories, drives etc. Unconscious aspects of the agent’s experiences, 
embodiment, etc. (if any) co-determining its decisions and behavior can be viewed from the 
agent’s perspective as non-deterministic aspects of its cognitive processes. 
9See Jacob von Uexkull’s convincing description of different Umwelts (subjective worlds) of 
different animals [38]. 
10These so called image schemata include basic spatial and topological relations, goal-directed 
movement etc. [4, 39]. 
11Some basic schemata may be innate. 
12A hyperedge is an edge connecting more than two vertices. A graph that contains 
hyperedges is called hypergraph. 
13Some situation schemata may have been forgotten. 
14See also the BDI architecture of Rao and Georgeff [40]. 
15The research in machine learning and artificial neural networks has yielded many good 
ideas how to extract knowledge from examples by mostly uninformed statistical 
calculations [41, 42]. 
16In the past, we have successfully formalized and implemented distinguishing criteria as 
similarity functions each with their own Mahalanobis metric with parameters induced from 
statistical characteristics of the exemplars [18]. 
17Constructors can also modify an existing detector when new exemplars arrive. 
18The function only returns a value for some inputs. It is undefined for others, which can be 
interpreted as a “don’t know” value. 
19However, in fact this condition is rarely satisfied. With non-algorithmic instruments, there 
is always a possibility of alternative (mis)interpretations. In our example with a case of 
malign tumour, all interpretations that misdiagnose a malign  tumour as benign are 
considered incorrect. 
20Depending on the labels specifying which vertices have numerical values assigned, the 
same schema can be used for multiplication, division, or checking the truth of the 
corresponding statement. 
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SEMANTIKA IZDVAJAJUĆIH KRITERIJA: OD 
SUBJEKTIVNOGA DO INTERSUBJEKTIVNOGA 
M. Takáč i J. Šefránek 
Odsjek primjenjene informatike – Fakultet matematike, fizike i informatike, Comeniusovo Sveučilište 
Bratislava, Slovačka 
SAŽETAK 
U  ovom  članku  gradimo  kognitivnu  semantiku  iz  perspektive  prvog  lica.  Cilj  nam  je  precizirati  značenja 
povezana s kognitivnim agentima, povezana s njihovim iskustvom i razdvojena od jezika, a koja pokrivaju 
široki spektar kognicija od živih bića (životinja, djece u dobi prije nego počnu govoriti te odraslih ljudi) do 
umjetnih agenata, te ostvariti kognitivnu semantiku širokog, kontinuiranog spektra. 
Perspektiva  prvog  lica  omogućuje  utemeljenje  značenja  u  kogniciji.  Sposobnost  kognitivnih  agenata  za 
izdvajanjem polazna je točka našeg pristupa, dok su kriteriji izdvajanja i shema osnovne semantičke konstrukcije. 
Zaključna konstrukcija temelji se na projekciji okoline na grozd tekućih percepata i projekciji funkcije sličnosti 
na percepte. Na taj temelj postavljeni su shema konteksta, sofisticiranije funkcije sličnosti, sheme događaja i 
kriteriji izdvajanja. Pravila zaključivanja i djelovanja dijelovi su naše semantike. 
Zanimljivo svojstvo predložene semantike je to što omogućuje koegzistiranje subjektivnog i intersubjektivnog 
značenja. Subjektivno (perspektiva prvog lica) značenje je primarno. Pokazali smo put od njega do kolektivno 
prihvaćenog  (perspektiva  trećeg  lica)  značenja  pomoću  opaženog  ponašanja  i  povratne  veze  o  uspjehu  ili 
neuspjehu djelovanja. 
Preuzeto zaključivanje značajno je sredstvo na tom putu. Uvedena je konstrukcija instrumenta koji predstavlja 
mjeru korištenja intersubjektivnog značenja. Instrument služi kao sredstvo uključivanja sofisticiranih značenja, 
npr. znanstvenih pristupa, u naš okvir. 
KLJUČNE RIJEČI 
značenje, kognitivna semantika, agent u kontekstu, shema, izdvajajući kriterij 